This paper explores the problems and processes that led to the birth of consumer bankruptcy in continental Europe, a process that began in Denmark in January1972 and culminated with the adoption of the Danish consumer debt adjustment act, G×ldssaneringslov, on 9 May 1984. While this law is often described in primarily humanitarian terms, in the sense of o¡ering a respite to ''hopelessly indebted'' individuals, both the motivation for the law and its intended scope were not simply accretions on an already multi-layered welfare system. Instead, the law was designed primarily as a pragmatic response to economically wasteful collections activities that imposed negative externalities on debtors, creditors, and especially Danish society and state co¡ers; the law was intended to force creditors to internalize (or eliminate) these externalities with respect to all debtors unable to pay their debts within a reasonable period of 5 years. The paper also examines the growing pains of this new system. The law originally left signi¢cant administrative discretion to judges, which produced vast disparities in treatment of cases in di¡erent regions of the country. Ultimately, a reform implemented in October 2005 made the system more accessible, more unitary throughout the country, and more humane. The e¡ects of this reform are already visible in statistical observations of the system, though signi¢cant regional variations persist. Given the striking coincidence in timing, this paper also o¡ers brief comparative comments on the parallel designöbut very di¡erent e¡ectöof the most signi¢cant reform of the US consumer bankruptcy law, also e¡ective in October 2005.
I. Introduction
Of all the wonderful places to live in the world, which country hosts the happiest residents? Many might suggest the landof opportunity inthe United States, but while the US may be the most patriotic country, 1 it is far fromthe world'shappiest.The title of world's happiestöor at least most satis¢edögoes to Denmark.
2 Why Denmark? Perhaps its because Danes are the world's biggest consumers of sugar and confectionary products. 3 Or maybe the answer is a bit darker: perhaps it's because Danes have ''consistently low (and indubitably realistic) expectations for the year to come,'' so these low expectations are easily met or exceeded, producing a warm sense of satisfaction. 4 The true reason for such an elusive concept as''happiness'' is likely to remain a mystery.
In addition to this happiness ranking, however, Denmark has one more somewhat surprising top ranking that is easier to explain: Denmark was the ¢rst continental European country to adopt a speci¢c legal regime aimed at treating the ills associated with consumer overindebtedness. Could this consumer insolvency law have contributedto overall Danish happiness? Adirect link seems unlikely, but Denmark's trend-setting consumer insolvency system o¡ers valuable lessons for the many other countries that have followed in its footsteps. To mine these lessons and make them more widely available in English, this paper explores in detail the problems, thought processes, and desire for solutions behind the birth of consumer bankruptcy in Denmark, beginning inJanuary 1972 and culminating with the adoption of the Danish consumer debt adjustment act, G×ldssaneringslov, on 9 May1984.While this law is most often described in primarily humanitarian or social support terms, the intentions and operation of this law were in fact motivated largely by broad-based economic concerns. In classic Scandinavian fashion, the Danish law was grounded in an intensely pragmatic desire to avoid the costly excesses and negative externalities of form-1. Sara Pardys, World' s Most and Least Patriotic Countries, Forbes (2 July 2008), online at http://www.forbes. com/2008/07/02/world-national-pride-oped-cx_sp_0701 patriot.html 2. See AdrianWhite, AGlobal Projection of SubjectiveWellbeing: A Challenge to Positive Psychology?, 56 Psychtalk, 17^20 (2007), online at http://www.le.ac.uk/users/ aw57/world/sample.html (University of Leicester study introducing the ¢rst ever ''world map of happiness,'' with Denmark in ¢rst place, and the US in a 10-way tie for16th with such countries as Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela); see also Happy Danes are here again (17 April 2007), online at http://www. admin.cam.ac.uk/news/press/dpp/2007041601 (describing the initial ¢ndings of the European Social Surveyalism in the debt collection processöa cost^bene¢t imbalance that is certainly not unique to Denmark.
Denmark wouldchart newanddangerousterritory withthis revolutionarydeparture from a long tradition of strict enforcements of obligations. Much discretion was thus left tothe courtsto developthe rules along the way, andthe radical new relief had to be shielded from misuse by imposing strict demands for both entry and the process of earning relief.This groundbreaking system thus o¡ers its primary lessons in terms of the changes it made after more than 20 years of experienceölonger than mostother Europeanconsumer insolvencysystemshavebeen in existenceeventoday. Judicial discretion turned out to be both a blessing and a curse, leading to vast disparities in treatment of cases in di¡erent regions of the country, so the main thrust of the reform implemented in October 2005 aimed at making the system more uniform, as well as mildly more accessible and more humane. At the same time, a parallel process was underway in the United States, also with the intent to bring more uniformity to the consumer bankruptcy system, though also to make it less accessible and, for some, less humane. Perhaps this explains the lower US ranking on the happiness scale. Whatever the comparison reveals about happiness in Denmark and the United States, this paper concludes with some comparative observations on the most signi¢cant reform of the US consumer bankruptcy law, which remarkably also became e¡ective at the same time as the Danish reform, in October 2005.
II. From Genesis to Germination: 1972^1984
The storyof the birth ofconsumer bankruptcy in continental Europe is atestament to the power of inspired individuals to make far-reaching and deeply signi¢cant change. Not government functionaries, but private individuals pushedthe ¢rst stones over the cli¡, leading to a landslide of legislative change all over Europe. Indeed, one man is largely to thank for starting the movement toward consumer bankruptcy and discharge across the continent. 5 Many others had been battling in the trenches of debt counseling and social medicine, and many participated in the movement to relieve hopeless debtors, but this man was the ¢rst to put his arguments and proposal into a form and forum that would ¢nally give traction to the idea of an o⁄cial, structured response to a growing problem of consumer overindebtedness.
5. I say ''continent'' here speci¢cally, as consumer debt reliefdevelopedquitedi¡erentlyintheUnitedKingdom, inpart, in£uencing later developments onthe continent, asdiscussedbelow.Otherproposalshadbeen£oatedear-lier, including one in Denmark as early as1941. See, e.g., Udkasttillovomg×ldsordning,udarbejdetafdenvedKgl.resolution af8.august1930nedsattecommission, (1941) [Draftlawondebt regulation, developed by the commission established by royalorder of 8 August1930].This early proposal, like many others, met with powerful criticism and thus did notleadtolegislativeaction.SeeLarsLindencronePeter-
A. The first call for ''social justice, '' January 1972
The barrister known simply as''Fr. Bang Olsen '' 6 from Nyborg deserves the undying gratitude of the thousands of desperate debtors whose mental health has been saved by the system Bang Olsen helped to create. Bang Olsen's paper in the very ¢rst pages of the 1972 volume of a Danish law periodical served as the catalyst for the ¢rst continental legislative action on consumer debt relief. In that paper, 7 Bang Olsen recounted that a conversation with a Danish Medical Association o⁄cer had prompted himto consider the close connectionbetween social medicine andthe legal system, especially the negative impact that the latter was having on the former. 8 He observed that social medical problems were predominantly a function of economic di⁄culties facilitated (indeed, arguably caused) by the public enforcement authority's mindless implementation of the system of forced collections. 9 Bang Olsen called for a modern reevaluation of this system, with special attention to the question whether the ills it created and exacerbated were unavoidable or should instead be subject to guaranties against unjusti¢ably expansive (negative) e¡ects. He took direct issue with a continuing blind adherence to the age-old notion, memorialized in the Danish Law of 1683, that everyone is responsible for ful¢lling his duly contracted obligations (the Danish equivalentof the evenolder Latin maxim, pactasuntservanda). Unobjectionable in most cases, this principle seemed problematic in cases in which the debtor could establish immediately that he could not pay the judgment without socially unacceptable consequences for himself and his family.
Bang Olsen lamented that the law provided no judicial authority to modify the creditor's claim''out of social considerations'' in light of the debtor's patent inability to pay. 10 Indeed, he argued that this situation was, particularly, unjust in light of the fact that enforcement actions against the debtor's meager property often produced insuf¢cient proceeds evento pay the enforcementcostsöwould it notbebetter to leave the debtor's property alone rather than transferring its depressed value to the enforcement organs? While creditors have rights, too, and they deserve to have their claims ful¢lled, Bang Olsen posited that society had moved beyond a willingness to impose unreasonably punitive and counterproductive e¡ects on impecunious debtors.
Bang Olsen proposed that judges be allowed, subject to evidence of the debtor's (in)ability to pay, to reduce judgments and claims to a level considered ''reasonable 6. More in-depth research revealed that ''Fr. '' stood for ''Frederik,'' the late father (deceased 24 September 2006) of Peter Bang-Olsen. Peter revealed the identity of his father ''Fr. ''and o¡ered more detail on the history of theJanuary 1972 article (he also explained that Frederik had the hyphen added to his family's name later, to advance its position in the telephone directory from ''O'' to ''B''!). E-mail from Peter Bang-Olsen to Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen, 2 March 2009, forwarded to and on ¢le with the author. 7. Fr. Bang Olsen, Social-retspleje, Advokatbladet, nr. 1, at 4 (1972). 8. The conversation appears to have occurred during an honors ceremony for one of Frederik's many brothers-in-law, Peter Skytte, a practicing physician mentioned in the opening of the paper. During a family deer hunt in the early 1970s in BÖvlingbjerg, Skytte apparently had reported seeing more and more people in his medical practice with serious and mounting problems with unserviceable debt, which robbed otherwise able-bodied workers of initiative and caused needless psychological trauma for debtors and their families. Skytte thus planted the seed in Frederik's mind as to the close and negative connection between law and social medicine. E-mail, supra note 6. 9. Bang Olsen, supra note 7, at 4^5. 10. Id. at 5. from a societal perspective'' in light not only of the substantive law, but also of the potentially inordinate social costs of enforcement on the debtor and his family. 11 The quid pro quo for reducing creditors'claims to a''reasonable and realistic'' level would be a payment plan, pursuant to which the debtor would use a speci¢cally reserved portion of future income to satisfy those claims.
The pragmatic cost^bene¢t foundation of this proposal is most clearly expressed in the closing sentence of the paper. It is illogical and counterproductive, Bang Olsen observed, that courts and public collection authorities on one day facilitate collections actions in support of claims on which creditors will ultimately not receive (full) payment, while social support authorities the next day consequently have to support the debtor and his family in the most costly way, including with medical and hospital assistancetotreat economicallybased maladies.
12 Thus, Bang Olsenargued for a new judicial authority to reduce negative externalities (especially on the social support system) caused by blind enforcement of practically uncollectable judgments for creditors who would receive little or nothing beyond the debtor's su¡ering.
This point was quickly taken up, and the idea modi¢ed, a few months later in the same periodical. A county administrator, H. Andrup, also criticized the illogical internal battle in a society that with one-hand funds collections that cause such signi¢cant hardship to citizens that the other hand is obliged to fund social support systems at much greater expense than what the enforcement system either collected or indeed had attempted to collect. 13 Going beyond Bang Olsen's proposal, however, Andrup advocated atrue insolvency response: a collective system for adjusting debts to a reasonable and realistic level. Rather than proceeding case by case, Andrup suggested, courts should reduce all of a hopelessly overburdened debtor's obligations to a levelthat would o¡er a reasonable chance for the debtor to service andeventually retire his debt. Andrup acknowledged the need for careful controls against abuse of this revolutionary global relief mechanism. Nonetheless, he again emphasized the obvious bene¢ts for society of allowing for the elimination of ''unrealistic debt''and allowing debtors in unfortunate economic conditions to reestablish themselves as ''decent citizens,''and get ''back in the game,''where''the game'' is digni¢ed and equal existence itself. 14 B. Organization and reform momentum: G×ldssaneringsrapporten, 1974^1975
Unwilling to allow their vision tobe relegatedto the yellowing pages of a law journal, in the fall of 1972, Bang Olsen and Andrup organized a private group of 16 legal and medical professionals to study this problem and consider solutions. 15 The group was In their ¢nal report, however, these reformers emphasized that they had gathered as private citizens, not as representatives of their o⁄ces/institutions. 16 This was grassroots advocacy at its best, as well as a testament to the power of interdisciplinary collaboration.
The study group's ¢nal report, known as the G×ldssaneringsrapport, sets forth what would remain the essential structure, driving purpose, and foundations of a new approach to ''rationalizing and humanizing the claims enforcement system with special attention to the adjustment of hopeless debts. '' 17 Based on a payment proposal worked up by a court-appointed assistant in light of the debtor's entire social and economic situation, courts already in charge of bankruptcy cases would be empowered in additiontowrite down or eliminate realistically uncollectible debts, excepting only ¢nes, penalties, and criminal restitution orders. 18 The G×ldssaneringsrapport was careful to point out repeatedly that the new system o¡ered not a right to relief, but an opportunity, which debtors needed to show they were ready and willing to work to achieve.
19 Allowing debts to fall away in full immediately might invite abuse, so o¡er-ing relief under clear conditions was seen as ''the furthest one can go. '' 20 In exchange for imposing this extraordinary new form of relief on creditors without asking for their vote, the new system would demand willingness by debtors to exert themselves, cooperate in a collective compromise, and turn over part of their future disposable income.
21
The income turnover aspect of this proposal is of considerable importance in light of the unique aspect of Danish law, both then and now, that prohibits wage garnishment for most private claims. 22 Consequently, converting uncollectible claims against low-value personal property into promised payment of valuable future money would represent a serious advantage for private unsecured creditors. Indeed, the G×ldssaneringsrapport expressed some doubt that this signi¢cant incursion into debtor wage-protection was warranted in exchange for creditors' simply writing down ''dubious debts to their factual value. '' 23 A rising incidence of public and private collections actions, however, added urgency to the group's proposal. 24 Like Bang Olsen's and Andrup's papers, the G×ldssaneringsrapport appealed initially to humanitarian concerns for fellow citizens laboring under unbearable psychological and economic burdens. 25 It observed that even debt collectors themselves (''as a rule the younger ones'') found the current collections system ''both irrational and inhuman. '' 26 But it quickly moved beyond this. Acknowledging that the notion of respect for contracts produced weightybene¢ts for both individuals and society, the report admitted that compassion for one's fellow man was insu⁄cient alone to support a new system of forced abandonment of valid claims.
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It thus quickly shifted focus to pragmatic, economic, almost utilitarian concerns, identifying several groups of principal bene¢ciaries of the proposed law. First, children of overburdeneddebtors couldescape growing up in an environment of pressure and harassment that would hinder them from joining society later with a loyal and positive attitude toward society. Otherwise, these children faced a danger of developinga negative attitude towardwork andpaying taxes, as well as an over-reliance on social assistance. Second, on a related and broader level, society, in general, would bene¢t in at least two additional ways. First, when debts are enforced without regard to reasonable ability to pay, debtors understandably fall prey to an''immoral but well understood and accepted notion of 'going on strike'. . . an inordinately costly phenomenon'' as society faces lost productivity and tax revenue, as well as rising public assistance expenditures. 28 Second, public collections authorities had expressed a desire for greater authority than the law current gave them to avoid the administrative work and expense associated with pursuing obviously uncollectible debts. Such collections often cost more than what could be collected, though the law o¡ered authorities precious little discretion to abandon such debts. 29 Finally, private creditors paradoxically stood the most to gain from a collective debt adjustment system. Individual creditors were motivated to press debtors to the law's extreme, not taking into account the interests of the collective of all creditors, thus increasing collections costs, depressing the value of available assets, and expanding losses for all. 30 Experience had shown that successful collection depended upon In sum, the G×ldssaneringsrapport sought to use the bankruptcy courts as a neutral intermediary to steer unreasonable creditors into embracing reasonable consensual workouts and halting collections pressure that externalized signi¢cant harm onto debtors, their families, other creditors, and societyöharmthat faroutweighed whatever meager advantages such actions brought to individual creditors. 32 This would both produce and spare real value, especially in the form of tax receipts and avoided social assistance and medical costs: ''Transforming even a modest number of social assistance recipients into taxpayers might well mean a gain of many millions of crowns. '' 33 Moreover, it would impose no real cost to put a rational end to''this ¢asco'' of endless and counterproductive collections actions. 34 Indeed, forcing creditors formally to write-o¡ claims established to be worthless would simply acknowledge already existing factual losses, not produce any real loss, other than a reduction of the ''moralizing e¡ect''that the continued pursuit of such claims''might be considered to have. '' 35 Of course, this approach places a great burden on the courts to establish claims as worthless by identifying ''can't pay''as opposed to ''won't pay'' debtors. Because the group could not agree on a clear list of criteria, the G×ldssaneringsrapport left this new challenge almost entirely unregulated, leaving the development of standardsto practice in the courts and the appellate review authority of the Supreme Court. 36 The group anticipated overly cautious judicial application of the new law in its initial years, hopefully expanding as time wore on.
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C. Official debt adjustment commission report: Bet×nkning, 1982 Grass-roots initiative only goes so far, so the group wisely reached out to both government and legislature. A ¢rst draft of the G×ldssaneringsrapport was circulated to interestedparties anddiscussedat a meeting in Christiansborg on 23 September1974, with several members of the Danish legislature (folketing) and theJustice Ministry. Based on this discussion and later follow-up comments, a ¢nal revised and supplemented report was issued in May 1975. Though the wheels of government grind slowly, they had been decisively set in motion. TheJustice Ministry immediately sent the G×ldssaneringsrapport on for hearings in a number of government agencies and legal organizations. A general sentiment emerged from these hearings that there was, indeed, a need for a formal means of authorizingöand mandatingöa write-down of uncollectible debts, especially tax and supports debts owed to the public sector. 39 On 20 January 1977, based explicitly onthe overwhelming support that the G×ldssaneringsrapport had received in these hearings, theJustice Ministry convened a special commission made up of representatives of tax, justice, and social authorities to further investigated the need for and optimal structure of the sort of system proposed in the G×ldssaneringsrapport.
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The o⁄cial commission's August1982 report became the basis (and most compelling interpretive source of legislative history, consistent with Scandinavian legal practice 41 ) for the ¢rst consumer debt adjustment and discharge law in continental Europe. It proposed a systemto allowdebtors''tobe put in aposition and motivatedto retire debts over the course of a foreseeable period [of 5 years]'' by reducing obligations to''the realistic portion of debts falling on overburdened debtors. '' 42 The o⁄-cial explanation of the need for debt adjustment closely trackedthe reasoning in Bang Olsen's and Andrup's papers and the G×ldssaneringsrapport. The core aim was still to overcome ''purposeless, expense-and resource-intensive misuse of the collections apparatus'' that serves only to exert undue economic and psychological pressure on hapless debtors. 43 The commission report again emphasized a desire for a structure to compel individual creditorsto consider their place inthe collective ofclaims and ¢nd a reasonable, workable compromise inthe light of all relevant interests, including not only the debtor's and creditors', but also society's. 44 Unlike earlier commentaries, the commission report contained very little appeal to human dignity and solidarity with one's''fellow man. ' 43. Id. at 7^10 (quoting passages from the G×ldssaner-ingsrapport regarding debtors' ''going on strike''and the harm to productivity, tax receipts, and social support bene¢ts, in addition to the harm to private creditors). Con¢rming the views expressed in the G×ldssanerings-rapport, the commission reportcontains detaileddiscussions of the relatively limited debt-forgiveness practices of the tax and customs authorities, including opinions by representatives of such authorities that formal write-o¡s of many of these debts would pose no signi¢cant lossöand would save the authorities substantial expenditures of time and resourcesöas continuing collections pressures resulted in broken and passive debtors and wasted e¡ort, not successful collections, but current law allowed them too little discretionto abandon such claims.The commission report also focused on the rising problem of practically uncollectable student loans, small business loans, and obligations to repay social assistance bene¢ts that had been retroactively recalculated. See id. at 56^66. 44. Id. at 9,79, 80, 85, 86. 45. See,e.g.,FrançoiseDomont-Naert,Letraitementdusurendettement dans un pays du nord de l' Europe: l' exemple danois, in Le Surendettement des Particuliers 89,96,97 (Michel Gardazed.,1997)(notingthateconomicargumentswere ''attheheart''ofthenewlaw,withsocialjusticesupporting the economic perspective). But see, e.g., Bet. 957/1982, at 74 (noting ''a heavy-weighing perspective'' of humane treatment of debtors and families). 46 to channel all earnings above a low threshold to creditors. 47 The commission report also echoed the G×ldssaneringsrapport's earlier observation that forcing creditors to acknowledge the real value of claims and recognize already existing factual losses would impose no real cost on creditors and would likely increase the amount and equality of payment to the creditor collective. 48 It added an important point about the intermediating role of the bankruptcy court for creditors who otherwise lack the motivation or ability to collect su⁄cient information to establish the extent to which further collections actions are unreasonable. 49 The dangers of ''a possible weakening of general payment morality'' and ''a substantial tightening of credit extension'' were acknowledged, 50 but the commission believed that the strict requirements of the law would serve as safeguards against abuse, guaranteeing that creditors would su¡er no real economic loss. 51 Thus, the principal foundation of the new law, from its inception through the legislative process, was a pragmatism characteristic of Scandinavian legal thought. No wonder, then, that the ¢rst continental European consumer insolvency law appeared in Denmark, whose''realist''legaltradition is noted for a skepticismtoward continental legal formalism, emphasizing instead a grass-roots practical approachto solving real-world problems. 52 Though compassion for one's fellow citizen, social solidarity, and a welfare-state desire to alleviate su¡ering were certainly motivating factors, these sentiments did not constitute the principal driving force behind the pioneering movement for debt adjustment in Denmark.
As in most European law reform discussions, the commission report includes a detailed evaluation of foreign law, 53 particularly, the laws in the UK and US that allowed for discharge of unpaid consumer debt. The report undertook a particularly detailed analysis of the development since 1705 of the Anglo-American law of 46. The report admits, on the one hand, that pursuit of hopeless debts seemed not to be a widespread phenomenon, but nonetheless, on the other hand, the ''mere existence'' of these debts created the negative consequences described. Bet 54 The report quotes at length from the 1977 US House of Representatives Judiciary Committee report on the need for reforms to Chapter 13 payment plans, focusing on the suggestion that overly formal procedures had inhibited the development of payment plans. 55 The committee described in quite complementary terms the US practice of allowing debtors to pay o¡ ''the realistic portion of their debts through payment of a portion of their future income,'' which ultimately o¡ered creditors better returns than a liquidation bankruptcy. 56 Nonetheless, the commission acknowledged that, while the notion of discharge had a long and continuous history in Anglo-American law, it represented a thoroughgoing break with Danish legal tradition, so the commission explicitly found that UK and US laws ''should not serve as models for Danish rules on debt adjustment. '' 57 Instead, the commission sought further support for its proposal by reaching far back into Danish history. During the debates on the ¢rst Danish bankruptcy act in 1858, a proposal had been advanced to allow bankrupts to be freed from personal liability on debts remaining after bankruptcy proceedings after 5 years on condition that theycould document goodeconomicbehavior and hadpaidunsecuredcreditors at least 50% of their claims. 58 This proposal was ultimately rejected on the grounds that it was opposed by ''general opinion,'' but the commission noted that it had been supported by very modern-sounding arguments to the e¡ect that ''it does not help to press [an insolvent debtor] immediately, but time must be given him to earn something. '' 59 By the early-1980s, the commission observed, public opinion had turned in favor of protecting debtors and avoiding unjusti¢ed enforcement costs, as evidenced by recent legal restrictions on debt collection and bankruptcy that sought to''change the legal-political situation, which to a higher degree emphasizes the need for £exibility. . . [and] should be provided with a'safety valve. ''' 60 The law had not yet gone so far as to allow debtors to make their way out of hopeless economic situations without the consent of at least a majority of their creditors, 61 so the commission strongly supported the ¢nal step of implementing a system for court-mandated adjustment, orderly payo¡, and discharge of debt, at least on certain rigorous preconditions. 61. The history of the parallel notion of forced compromise (tvangsakkord), pursuant to which a payment and discharge plan canbe imposedon a dissenting minority of creditors by majority creditor vote, was discussed by the committee at length, noting that this relief was limitedto merchants, manufacturers and shippers until 1905, and even after that, one large creditor or a few non-participating creditors could rob a compromise agreement of its force, and after the uni¢ed Bankruptcy Law of 1977 (Konkursloven), a 25% minimum dividend was required. Id. at 18^24, 133. The 25% minimum was reduced to 10% in the 2005 reform. The ¢rst,''objective'' criterion allows relief only for debtors su¡ering from ''quali¢ed insolvency;''that is, the debtor is not able and has no prospect of being able to pay o¡ debts in full 68 in the near future (generally 5 years). 69 While this test envisions a relativeandindividualizeddisconnectbetweendisposableincomeanddebt,sonominimum debt burden was established in the statute, practice soon developed to require at least 250 000 crowns (s 25 500/US$ 29 400) 70 of debt for able-bodied debtors and 100 000 (s10 200/US$ 11750) for retirees and disabled people to establish this factor. 71 This test invites courtsto undertake an immediate evaluation of the debtor's way of life and his or her attempts to modify it in response to ¢nancial hardship. Relief can be rejectedatthe outset for debtorswho dedicate morethana''reasonable''amountoftheir income to living expenses (especially housing and cars). 72 The method for identifying ''reasonable'' living expenses was left to discretionary case-by-case development through individual court judgments (and supervision by appellate courts).
73
Another signi¢cant aspect of this ¢rst ''objective''test bars the door to debt adjustment for debtors whose economic situation is ''unclear. '' 74 Thus, temporarily unemployedable-bodied debtors should not expect relief, because it is not certainthat their insolvency will persist for 5 years. 75 Similarly, debtors continuing to operate small businesses generally do not qualify for relief, as business receipts and expenses vary too signi¢cantly in most cases. 76 Indeed, some courts have also excluded cases on the grounds that an anticipated inheritance in the reasonably near future renders the debtor's ¢nancial circumstances ''unclear. '' 77 68. The''in full''part is somewhat unclear on the face of the law, but the commission report de¢nitely envisions insolvency as being a function of inability to ''ful¢ll'' (opfylde) debts; that is, pay ''in full'' (fuldt ud). See, e.g., Bet. 957/1982, at 87, 89, 121 (using these phrases to describe qualifying debtors). 69. Konkurslov x 197; Bet. 957/1982, at 91, 108, 121. The phrase''inthe near future''was added in1987 to con¢rm the already clear intention that ¢ve years would be the guiding period. See Bet. 1449/2004, at 58. 70. All currency conversions in this paper are rounded for ease of reading and are based on a rate of 8.50 Danish crowns to 1.00 US dollar to 0.867 Euro (9.80 Danish crowns per Euro), based on the average of OECD ¢gures for purchasing power parity (''PPP'') for actual individual consumption and GDP from 2000 to 2008, online at http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/Index.aspx?datasetcode¼SNA_TABLE4. As the OECD table illustrates, the market exchange rate for these currencies has £uctu-ated substantially over the years, falling signi¢cantly throughthe 2000s, while PPP ¢gures have not £uctuated sowidely. UsingthePPPconversioneliminatesthearti¢-cial skewing e¡ect of time and market exchange rates as well as price di¡erences in the two areas, as the PPP exchange rate is based on how much of each currency a debtor ineach regionwould need''tobuy the same representativebasketofconsumergoodsandservices. ' The second,''subjective'' set of criteria originally required the court to evaluate each individual case to overcome a negative presumption that relief would not generally be appropriate. That is, the court had to overcome this presumption by being convinced that the debtor's''behavior and circumstances otherwise speak in favor''of debt adjustment. 78 This judgment was to be based on a holistic evaluation of the debtor's circumstances, but with particular regard for a series of enumerated items: 79 (1) the likelihood that a discharge will help the debtor to regain social and economic equilibrium, and not return to a perpetual state of indebtedness going forward 80 ; (2) debts of an age that demonstrate long-term struggles with an unmanageable debt burden; (3) respectable circumstances of the majority of the debts' having arisen (not mostly ¢nes, penalties, and ''irresponsible'' debts 81 ), though ''bad'' debts were not strictly prohibitive, especially if substantial time had passed since such debts were incurred 82 ; (4) the debtor's responsible e¡orts to service and otherwise manage debts;
83 and (5) the debtor's conduct during the case, especially with respect to full disclosure of ¢nancial information.
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The court makes these determinations at an initial hearing based on the debtor's written application and oral responses to questions posed at the hearing, where debtors are generally unrepresented. 85 Debtors seek relief by ¢ling a sworn application with their local court that handles estates and bankruptcy cases (skifteret). The form application contains detailed information about the debtor's personal and ¢nancial situation, including a list of creditors.
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One extremely common requirement in other consumer insolvency regimes is conspicuously absent in the Danish system. Unlike virtually every other system that would follow, no debt counseling or out-of-court negotiation with creditors is required before seeking formal coercive relief. 87 The commission concluded that anything like the forced compromise system (tvangsakkord), which was designed for businesspeople seeking to avoid bankruptcy, was unsuitable for consumer debtors who could not o¡er a signi¢cant and relatively quick dividend to creditors.
88 Indeed, as a fundamental policy matter, the commission explained that the debt adjustment system was designed to rehabilitate consumers struggling with hopeless debt by 90 Statistics on earlier years are not readily publicly available, but extrapolations from secondary studies suggest that this rejection rate has remained steady throughout the life of the law. 91 Striking as these results may be to outside observers, they are a bit less troubling in light of the unique Danish prohibition on wage garnishment by private creditors.The rami¢cations of a rejected debt adjustment application are not nearly as severe given the limitations on debt collection outside this system. Indeed, despite the absence of a consensual negotiation requirement, one might interpret these Danish results as being broadly consistent with trends elsewhere in Europe: more than half of all debtors are relegated to out-of-court negotiations with creditors to work something out in light of the debtor's ability to pay and the leverage provided by the otherwise quite debtor-protective Danish debt collection regime.
Moreover, the high rejection rate has at least two compelling explanations. 92 First, unemployment is overwhelmingly the most common factor in overindebtedness in Europe and elsewhere, and in Denmark, many applications are likely rejected because, as mentioned above, a temporarily unemployed debtor's future economic situation is ''unclear. ''As counterproductive as this might seem, on second glance, it probably approximates the result even in more liberal systems such as the US. It is a truism among the US bankruptcy lawyers that one should seek relief only after 89. In contrast, when Sweden adopted its ¢rst consumer debt adjustment system, it also imposed a requirement on municipalities to support budget-and debtcounseling. SeeJasonJ. Kilborn, Out with the New, in with the Old: As Sweden Aggressively Streamlines its Consumer Bankruptcy System, Have U.S. Reformers Fallen O¡the Learning Curve?, 80 Am Bankr L J, 435, 441 and n. 36 (2007). The Danish commission predicted that the rules on public support for debt advice would eventually need to be revised to o¡er public payment to lawyers and other professionals for debt advice and the development of consensual workouts, Bet having reached the nadir of distress, established some stability, andbegun a return to ¢nancial health. Seeking debt relief midway through an unemployment stint will likely result in more distress after relief has been granted, and one can seek relief again only after a waiting period of several years. Thus, the Danish system has a built-in formal requirement that debtors heed the sort of advice that good lawyers would o¡er them in the United States. A second and related reason for the high rejection rate is that Denmark lacks a government-supported system of debt counseling, and legal aid is not available for debt cases. 93 Thus, debtors generally complete and ¢le their debt adjustment applications with little or no guidance 94 other than pamphlets distributed by the courts 95 and information gleaned from the internet. 96 Without dedicated expert guidance, as well as support for the arduous task of collecting and reporting the complex ¢nancial information needed to complete the application, 97 many debtors likely fail to ¢ll out the application completely or correctly and/or respondto questionsto the satisfaction of the court, or they simply abandon the process, perhaps at the point when they receive the order calling them to appear in court with supporting documentation, alone, to confront a judge at the initial hearing. 98 For debtors who make it to the hearing, the court is required to o¡er guidance to debtors in seeking relief, so many rejected applications are likely ¢led a second or third time, perhaps successfully. 99 As mentioned above, just as the US bankruptcy lawyers advise many potential clients to wait to ¢le until after hitting ''rock bottom,''the Danish courts likely advise (require) many debtors to abandon their cases until they regain some ¢nancial stability, so as to avoid more trouble after having entered the relief system.
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B. Payment plan proposal and immediate discharge
For the few debtors who make it through this narrow entryway, a guide awaits them inside,asthedebtadjustmentprocessbeyondisfraughtwithobstacles,aswell.Justasthe G×ldssaneringsrapport had emphasized, the explicit quid pro quo for relief remains the debtor's readiness to propose payment to creditors from several years of future 101 Upon issuing an order opening a debt adjustment case, the court appoints a neutral trustee (medhj×lper) 102 to collect the necessary information on the debtor'seconomicandpersonalsituationforthefurtherdevelopmentofthecase. 103 The trustee also assists the debtor in developing a proposal to explain the circumstances calling for relief and o¡ering a payment plan for the''realistic''portion of the debt. 104 After a delay to allow the trustee to collect information, 105 the debtor (that is, trustee) presents the proposal at a second court hearing, at which creditors are allowed to opine on the case and pose questions to the debtor. 106 Creditors generally have little to say, however (andthus most often do not appear at the meeting 107 ), as the essential terms of the proposed order are quite limited.The debtor's proposal simply sets out the amount andgeneral nature of the total debtburdenandan equal percentage to which all unsecured 108 debt will be written down, 109 payment percentage is calculated simply by multiplying the debtor's monthly disposable income by the number of months in the plan, and dividing that ¢gure by the total debt burden. If the court is satis¢ed that the debtor has the means and willingness to abide by the plan, the proposal is accepted by court order, and the discharge takes place immediately.
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Disposable income and plan length are thus the key issues, and the law originally left both questions open to individual case-by-case and court-by-court discretion. Unlike the G×ldssaneringsrapport, 113 the commission report resisted establishing clear guidelines on the amount of anticipated income to be left to debtors, and thus the per cent by which debts that cannot be paid from excess income should be written down. 114 The commission report left it to the courts to establish acceptable write-down percentages based on the court's discretionary evaluation of each individual debtor's anticipated future income and expense allowances to support a''modest lifestyle '' 115 and to give debtors a''realistic ability to pay [remaining debts]. '' 116 In the early years, most plans called for monthly payments of 500^3000 crowns (s 50^300/US$ 603 50), though these amounts varied signi¢cantly from case to case.
117
As to plan length, though a speci¢c period was not laid down in the law itself, the very in£uential commission report suggested an increase from the two years proposed by the G×ldssaneringsrapport to 5 years. 118 The choice of 5 years was made based on a number of comparables: A powerful policy of ¢nality upon issuance of the discharge order prevents either the court or the trustee from guiding the debtor in making the payments called for by the plan. 125 To help debtors to manage the payments by themselves, the trustee's very ¢rst step is generally to open a dedicated bank account in which the debtor immediately begins depositing disposable income (thus immediately starting the 112. In an exceptional aspect of Danish law, the discharge occurs without regard to the debtor's completion of the plan. See Petersen, supra note 5, at 277; see also infra Part III.B. 113. See supra note 21 and Bet. 957/1982, at 172 (2-year maximum period, 20% max after-tax income payments). 114. The commission suggested that a standard budget scheme be developed and o⁄cially adopted ''as soon as possible,'' and it proposed a model scheme used by the Odense tax authorities with expense categories, but no proposed amounts. See Bet.957/1982, at157 and App.5. 115. Id. at 6,90 (''beskeden levefod'').The commission also considered and rejected the notion of requiring a minimum dividend to creditors. Bet 5-year payment plan clock). 126 If the plan is ultimately approved, the trustee generally forwards to the bank a list of creditors, their account numbers, 127 and the percentages of the debtor's accumulated monthly deposits to be divided once each year among creditor accounts electronically. 128 In light of the recently recon¢rmed Danish prohibition on wage cession/garnishment by private creditors, 129 the commission rejectedan earlier recommendation for imposing mandatory wage-transferordersto further secure payments to creditors.The commission suggested that debtors should be encouraged to make the required deposits and payments through automatic bank transfers, 130 but debtors generally retain free disposition of their wages and are responsible for making the monthly deposits themselves. 131 About 70% of cases admitted into the system result in a con¢rmed plan.
132 Though reliable statistical ¢gures on the rate of plan non-con¢rmation are not available, one suspects that nearly all plans submitted to hearing by the trustees are con¢rmed by the courts. 133 The dedicated court-appointed trustees doubtless know the court's unwritten rules on expenses and write-down percentages, and they are not beholden todebtorstoproposeplansthatareunlikelytobecon¢rmed.Thelowcarry-throughrate islikelyattributableto casesbeingabandonedbydebtorsbeforethe con¢rmation hearing once they see the real demands of the payment plan, 134 or dismissed by the courts upon complaints from the trustee concerning debtor non-cooperation.
IV. Trial, Error, and Reform: 1999^2005 and Beyond
The dangers foreseen in the G×ldssaneringsrapport and the commission report began to materialize almost immediately. A gradual development of this new law based on the speci¢c circumstances of Danish practice was intended, especially with respect to the delicatebalancebetweeno¡eringreliefandavoidingabuse.Leavingcriticaldetailsopen to judicial discretion, however, quickly produced vast non-uniformity in treatment of debtors across the country, running contrary to a strong desire for reasonably equal treatment. 135 In addition to the problem of regional variation, again as anticipated, Inlightoftheseandotherproblems,almostexactly15yearsafterthenewlawhadbeen adopted, representative organizationsof court administratorsand lawyers initiatedthe process that would result in the most substantial reform of the system. Like the G×ldssa-neringsrapport before it, a report and proposal from these private groups 138 spurred government action that led to another o⁄cial commission investigation, report, and proposed reform, 139 as well as ultimate legislative implementation of most of the recommended changes, though only after a period of several years. The reform bill was adopted by unanimous vote on 24 May 2005 and became Law no. 365, e¡ective 1 October 2005. 140 The stated goal of this reform was to make the system more uniform, primarily,butalsotomakeitsimplerandmoree¡ectiveinprovidingmeaningfulrelief.
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A. ''Local legal culture'' and regional non-uniformity Theprimaryconcernmotivatingthereforme¡ort wasa substantialregionalvariation in two related areas: the ratio of applications to con¢rmed plans, and the income and expense allowances used by courts in arriving at con¢rmable plans and debt writedown percentages. In a split victory, the former was left largely unchanged, while the latter was subjected, at least in part, to formal unifying guidelines.
Admission and '' success''rates
The vastdi¡erences inthe''successrate''ofapplications seeking relief drew the harshest criticisms. Admissiondidnotguaranteerelief.Thereallightningrodforcriticismwasthelowratio ofsuccessfulplancon¢rmationorderstototalclosedcasesandthewidevariationsinthis ratio among districts. In 2002, the average''success rate''was 29%; that is, of 4780 total cases closed that year,1376 closed with a con¢rmed plan (all others were closed unfavorably, either by an unfavorable ruling fromthe court rejecting the application or the planorby withdrawalbythe debtor). But whilethecourt in -rhusclosed 41%of its244 cases successfully, the courts in -lborg and Randers con¢rmed plans in only 19 and 15%,respectively,ofthe136casesclosedbyeachofthosetwocourts.Asinmostyears,the Copenhagen court had a miserly success rate of only 13% of its 8689 closed cases. 145 Thesedisparitiesweresostrikingthattheyevencaughttheattentionofthepressandthe legislature.
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The reform commission largely dismissedthese criticisms andproposed only mild revisions. It concluded that variations in admissions and plan con¢rmation rates were likely to persist in any event in light of regional variations in economic conditions and for other sound reasons. 147 The extreme and relatively consistent variations among admission and con¢rmation rates in various courts are hardto explain interms of objective characteristics, so one might take issue withthe commission's glib rejection of this problem. Nonetheless, no empirical data were (or are) available to challenge its conclusion and support more thoroughgoing reform. 148 Ultimately, an incremental increase in uniformity in the admissions process was accomplished by refocusing the court's inquiry on the speci¢c characteristics that in practice had excluded relief and reversing the original presumption against admission; that 143. All of the statistics from which these percentages are calculated are available at the court administration's site, http://www.domstol.dk/om/talogfakta/ statistik/Pages/skiftesager.aspx. 144. The range increases if one considers the smaller districts, though the small numbers reduce the validity of these statistics: the court in S×by admitted 86% of its 28 applications, while the court in Ringsted admitted only 15% of its 47 applications. 145. Again, the disparities are more striking in the smaller districts, though the small numbers skew the statistics.While the success rate for the court in NykÖb-ing Mors was a spectacular 80% of 15 total closedcases, and 74% of 46 cases closed in FÔborg, the courts in Skanderborg and Esbjerg brought to a happy conclusion only about 12% of their 51 and 93 total closed cases, respectively. . Ultimately, the commission concluded that, even if variations were undesirable, it simply would not be possible to impose greater uniformity by tighter formulation of the entry requirements. Id. at 87, 88. 148. The reform commission noted, in discounting the e¡ect of regional variations in admissions rates, that it had no empirical data suggesting the characteristics of debtors whose applications were accepted or rejected, so it could not conclude that the regional variations were not based on objective variations among cases. Indeed, it explicitly refused to undertake such studies itself because ''the need for the changes in the current law, which the commission recommends, to a signi¢cant degree are independent of quantitative considerations. ' is, insolvent debtors now should be allowed into the system unless these speci¢c circumstances exist or some other circumstance ''suggests decisively against. '' 149 This mild reform, however, was designed largely to re£ect what hadalreadydeveloped in practice.The reform commission noted with some displeasure that relief had been granted to a greater extent than originally intended as a result of the judicial erosion of the second,''subjective''evaluation of the appropriateness of relief in light of all of the debtor's circumstances, such that a ¢nding of insolvency was most often the end of the inquiry. 150 Consequently, the reform did little more than con¢rm current practice and clarify some speci¢c examples of subjective elements that might ''weight decisivelyagainst''relief. Moreover, the verydemandingand still subjective appraisal of the debtor's ''quali¢ed insolvency,'' including the requirement that the debtor's ¢nancial situation be free from signi¢cant uncertainty, remains a signi¢cant entry hurdle. A rare and informal empirical survey within the main court in Copenhagen in 2001indicatedthat its high application rejection rate was explained in large part as a function of this''uncertainty''provision (32% of rejections on thisbasis). 151 This and other common rejection determinations are largely una¡ected by the reform.
Thus, this aspect of the reform should not be expected to have produced a substantial change in either the low level or the disparities in admission rates among courts. Immediately following the October 2005 e¡ective date, the percentages of accepted ¢lings and granted debt adjustments rose noticeably, but they had fallen back to historical levels already by 2008. While the original commission in 1982 expected 10 000 annual applications for debt relief, and about 5000 admissions, 
Budget and payment plan variations
The most signi¢cant reform addressed non-uniformities in budgetary guidelines imposed on debtor payment plans. Leaving this question completely open to court discretion has worked poorly in other countries, as well, 154 and Denmark ¢nally joined a number of other countries in setting down a more structured, uniform, and predictable approach to debtor budgeting. 151. Seeid. at 44,45 (using total cases as the divisor, not rejected cases). The other bases for rejection were also largely una¡ected by the reform or were identi¢ed as speci¢c circumstances that weigh against relief: (1) subjective judgments as to the ''irresponsible'' nature of the debt (31% rejections based on the predominance of tax or recent and expansive consumer debts), (2) withdrawal by debtors after the ¢rst meeting or failure to appear (16%), and (3) a variety of miscellaneous other causes (20.5%). Id. As anticipated, the courts had developed generally similar budgeting practices allowing for debtors'actual ''reasonable''costs for a list of ¢xed expenses and a standard basic budget for variable and miscellaneous expenses. An empirical survey in 1998, however, revealed wide di¡erences in the types and amounts of speci¢c expenses allowed by various courts, as well as in the amount of the standard basic budget allowance. Some courts had accepted separate allowances for such things as life insurance, rental of televisions and other household hardware, dental and eye care, and extraordinary expenses for child visitation for separated parents, while other courts had required debtors to cover such expenses from their basic budget allowance (called the rÔdighedsbelob). Further, the amount of this basic budget was generally (though not always) set out in local court rules, and it varied widely. For example, the range of basic monthly budgetary allowances for singles varied from 2500 to 3500 crowns, for couples from 4000 to 6000 crowns, and for children from 500 to 1500 crowns. 155 In 2004, the basic monthly budget allowance in the main court in Copenhagen stoodat 3500 crowns (s350/US$ 400) for singles,6000 (s600/US$ 700) for couples, and 1100 (s110/US$ 130) for each child.
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The principal innovation in the reform proposal was thus to unify the list of generally accepted ¢xed expenses and to eliminate the signi¢cant variations in the basic budget for food, clothing, and miscellaneous expenses. The reform commission adopted the recommendation of the court administrator and lawyer associations, which in turn essentially revived the original 1982 commission's proposal to have theJustice Ministry set down uniform allowances in an o⁄cial order. 157 Rather than trying to micromanage a long list of expense types, the commission proposedthat the courts continue to allow ''reasonable''actual expenditures on a narrower list of a few types of expenses shared by most debtors (housing, childcare, child visitation for separated parents, and support obligations 158 ) as well as extraordinary expenses for such things as medical care for chronic conditions and extraordinary required transport costs. The variety of ''other'' expenses di¡erent households might bear would be relegated to a standard basic budget allocation of 4180 crowns (s 425/ US$ 490) per month for singles and 7080 (s725/US$ 835) for couples.These ¢gures were established by averaging detailed household consumption survey data for ''reasonable consumption'' for various age groups and genders. 159 In addition to harmonizing practice, the reform humanizedthe process, as well, by lightening the burden on many debtors.Though the commission expressly disavowed anyintentiontomakethebudgetallowancesmoregenerousthanundertheoriginallaw andpreviouspractice, 160 thebasicbudgetallowanceitproposedwasnearly20%higher than the upper range of allowances then applied by most courts. 161 In addition to supporting more livable budgetary expenses, the reform also enhancedthe income side of the ledger for many debtors. Most importantly, transfer payments for children (a signi¢cant portion of the income of many low-income Danish debtors) are now explicitly setasideforchildren,soanyexcessremainingaftercoveringactualchildcareexpensesis no longer included in the debtor's income otherwise subject to distribution to creditors.
162 Thus, families with children are among the primary bene¢ciaries of the reform, shielding more income and receiving greater expense allowances thanbefore.
The Justice Ministry adopted the commission's proposed order virtually verbatim. 163 The annual order still allows substantial leeway for variations from region to region and court to court in determining ''reasonable'' housing and other ¢xed expenses, but all courts are now bound to a uni¢ed budgetary baseline for miscellaneous expenses.With annual indexing, the basic budget for 2009, for example, is 5170 crowns (s525/US$ 600) per month for singles and 8770 (s895/US$ 1030) for couples, with a sliding scale for children of various ages, from1410 to 2600 crowns (s144^265/ US$ 165^300) per month for younger and older children, respectively. 164 The new guidelines are thus simpler, more uniform, and generally more ''livable'' than many courts had allowed before, especially for families with children.
After a temporary spike in ''success'' rates immediately following the reform, more manageable budgetary guidelines have done little to a¡ect ¢ling or plan con¢rmation rates.While the reform commission speculated that clearer budget guidelines might dissuade some from ¢ling, the ¢ling rate has held quite steady, except for a temporary bump in 2005 166 Consistently fewer than a third of all cases successfully navigate between the Scylla of the ¢rst, application hearing and the Charybdis of the second, plan con¢rmation hearing.
B. Modification of plans post-confirmation
Another reform of note concerned the common problem of post-con¢rmation changes in circumstances. The Danish rules on modi¢cation of plans after con¢r-mation are unique, andtheycausedproblems intheiroriginal form. If a debtor failsto pay according to the plan, creditors can enforce the payment obligation, 167 but the immediate discharge upon con¢rmation remains unless the debtor has grossly neglected his duties under the plan, in which case the court can revoke the plan and reinstate the discharged debt.
168 Post-con¢rmation modi¢cation of the plan is allowed, but both modi¢cations and revocations have been extremely rare in practice. 169 The paucity of modi¢cations was due in large part to a pair of restrictions in the original law. First, modi¢cations still today canbe made only in debtor's''most exceptional interest '' 170 ; therefore, creditors cannot request modi¢cations to increase payments to them if the debtor's situation improves. Second, originally, if the debtor su¡ered adverse economic changes, the plan could be modi¢ed, but only to a limited extent. If the debtor missed several payments, for example, the plan might be modi¢edto lengthenthe repayment period (beyond 5 years) to allow time for the debtor to 169. See, e.g., Domont-Naert, supra note 45, at 95; Bet. 1449/2004, at 321^323 (noting that much more than simply failing to pay was required, such as the debtor's intentionally spending the collected annual savings on something other than distribution to creditors); Skat, supra note 41, x H.6.5.4 (noting that revocation of the plan requires ''a very gross neglect'' of the law's requirements, emphasis in the original). 170. Konkurslov x 228 ('' ganske s×rlige hensyn''); Bet. 173 While the reform reiterated and con¢rmed that plans could not be modi¢ed to increase the amount to be paid to creditors, 174 the amended language clari¢ed that notjustthe length, but anyaspectof the plan, couldbe modi¢ed, includinga reduction in the required payout, perhaps calling for no further payment at all. 175 The commission suggested, however, that such modi¢cations should be a last resort, to be applied only if a reasonable extension of the payment term will not put the debtor back on track to making the payments called for in the plan. 171. This had occurred far more frequently in practice than had been anticipated. Bet. 1449 Bet. /2004 , at 317^318 (citing a case where the plan term had been extended to 13.5 years). The debtor might also need more time to pay if a secured de¢ciency arose after a secured creditor sold the collateral after con¢rmation of the plan. While secured claims are not a¡ected by a plan, unsecured de¢ciency claims are, Konkurslov x 199(2), but the debtor has to pay the same percentage on the de¢ciency as promised to other unsecured creditors. If a de¢ciency arises after a creditor forecloses on a mortgage after plan con¢rmation, this might vastly increase the debtor's payment obligations, as no amount could be set aside in the plan to cover such claims that might arise after plan con¢rmation. Bet. 957/1982, at 6, 108, 139^140, 165 (suggesting that such later-arising de¢ciency claims would seldom pose a problem, as the plan is designed to put the debtor in a position to service reasonable remaining secured debts). Indeed, for distressed mortgages on homes with suddenly depressed values, continuing to service in£ated mortgage payments might be deemed ''unreasonable''and prevent a debtor from seeking relief while remaining in the now-overvalued home. The reform movement immediately included a proposal to rectify these problems. D&A Report, supra note 64, at 48, 49 (noting that most practitioners agreed that this situation was not acceptable). The reform commission agreed and made a detailed and novel proposal to modify claims secured by principal residences by (1) reducing mortgage claims secured by principal residences to the value of the home plus a bu¡er of 10% and (2) paying (a small percent of) the unsecured de¢ciency in the plan. Bet. 1449 Bet. /2004 . Unlike the great majority of the commission's other recommendations, however, this proposal did not even make it into thebill. At aJustice Ministry hearing on the commission's report, ¢nance and mortgage credit representatives objected that this measure failed to take su⁄cient account of lenders' interests and concentrated on them the risk of price de£ation based on macro-economic forces beyond anyone's control. The Justice Ministry hesitated to embrace this proposal without a closer empirical examination of the problem, so the provision was removed in light of the fundamental position of secured creditors and the proper balance between debtors and creditors that lies at the base of the consumer insolvency system. Moreover, the ministry concluded that no evidence suggested that undersecured mortgage claims had caused signi¢cant problems for debtors seeking or receiving relief. A preclusive claims-bar date had been originally proposed in the G×ldssaneringsrapport, but it was rejected in the 1982 commission report to avoid the debtor's ability to ''speculate''on creditors' passivity by failing to mention them and hoping they would not make later claims. Bet. 957/1982, at11,14,164.This problem was criticized immediately, see, e.g., D&A Report, supra note 64, at 37^39, and the reform commission ultimately hadto admit that therewas no real riskof debtor manipulation here, Bet.1449/2004, at 243, so the claims period was increased to 8 weeks, after which unannounced claims are discharged. See also Skat, supra note 41, x H.6.4.1 (positing that this rule applies to later-arising mortgage de¢ciency claims, as well, and advising secured creditors to ¢le proofs of possible de¢ciency claims to preserve their right to payment later, even though they will not be paid in the plan).
C. Other reforms
A number of other smaller but signi¢cant changes were made in 2005, as well. Some were discussed in the notes above, 177 but among the other notable changes were the following three: ¢rst, claims disputed by the debtor are now discharged in full unless the creditor ¢les a suit on the claim within 3 months and establishes the claim in an ordinary civil suit.
178 One suspects few creditors will do this, as creditors will be loath to seek Pyrrhic victories by ¢nancing this litigation up front, knowing that even if they successfully defend their claims, they will collect only a small fraction of the court costs and principal claim in the debtor's plan. Second, in a pragmatic e¡ort to reduce the administrative burden of paying on de minimis claims (including bank payment processing costs that often exceedthe annualpayments due on such claims), claims on which the total expected distribution falls below 500 crowns (s51/US$ 60) will be discharged immediately. 179 Finally, debtors who have recently made irregular and unreasonably large pension deposits may have to pay out at least a portion of this shielded income to creditors to get a con¢rmed plan. Similarly, debtors who receive lump-sum distributions of pensions and other retirement savings might have to include a limited amountö10% per yearöas income to be distributed to creditors in the plan.
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As for the very few proposals that failed to make their way into the reform law, in addition to an ill-fated home mortgage lien-stripping proposal, 181 lawmakers refused to impose a stay on wage garnishment for tax and other public debt collections in the ''gap period'' between admission of a debt adjustment case and a con¢rmed plan. Other enforcement e¡orts are stayed upon the court's accepting an application, but as before, the stay applies to garnishment in pursuit of public claims only upon con¢rmation of a plan. 182 The state had to collect its last few drops of blood before forfeiting most of its remaining claim in a debt adjustment plan!
V. Comparison with the US BAPCPA
In an amazing coincidence of timing, both Denmark and the United States implementeda major consumer debt adjustment reform in October 2005. Inthe US, the socalled ''BankruptcyAbuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act'' became e¡ec-tive on17 October 2005. Its legislative intent, design, ande¡ectcompare in interesting ways with those of the Danish reform.This is not the place for a detailed examination of the complex new US law, but a few passing observations o¡er food for thought. ) are now used as expense allowances to assess whether above-median-income debtors have the ''means'' to a¡ord a Chapter 13 payment plan, and these budgetary guidelines specify the allowances in a payment plan for such debtors. 184 But while Danish lawmakers were motivated by a desire to make the system clearer and more fair for debtors, the US lawmakers were motivated by a desire to stamp out perceived abuse of a system that demanded too little of debtors and so disadvantaged creditors. Both chose a bi-partite approach to expenses, with speci¢c expense categories for ''¢xed''costs and a lump-sum allocation for food, clothing, out-of-pocket health care expenses (such as dental and eye care), and other basic budgetary items.
While it is impossible to compare the still subjective allowances for housing and other ¢xed expenses o¡ered by the Danish courts with the complex rules applied in the USto such expenses, one can gain some insight intothe tenor of the two reformsby comparing the basic budget allocations. Recall that the Danish reform generally increased the basic budget allowances for debtors, and it reserved all child-related public assistance payments for debtors. 185 Using a PPP conversion rate 186 and averaging the allowances for children of various ages, the Danish and US basic budget guidelines currently (as of mid-March 2009) compare as follows:
The US ¢gures can be increased by $ 20^$ 50 per month for extra food and clothing expenses, but only upon the debtor's special request based on documented need, but anecdote suggests that this is happening quite rarely. Especially without this discretionary increase, the US allowances are remarkably lower than the Danish equivalents (except for childless couples), especially for families with children. Indeed, the disparity is even greater for families with children, as their disposable income is supplementedby generous child allowances in Denmark, but not inthe US. Even a few dollars of shortfall makes a big di¡erence to families struggling to survive on these tight budgets. Note that the fact that the cost of living is much higher in Denmark does not o¡er an explanation, as the conversion is based on purchasing power parity for actual individual consumption (a conversion using the market exchange rate of Danish crowns to US dollars would produce a dramatic but misleading 50% increase in the Danish allowances).While few US debtors are actually forcedto live withinthese guidelines, as their income is so low as to exempt them from forced payment plans, 187 the miserly spirit of the BAPCPA reform is vividly illustrated by comparing the US and Danish budget allocations.
B. Treatment of secured debts
Like in Denmark, secured claims in the United States have always been treated as virtually sacrosanct and e¡ectively immune from forced adjustment. In the ¢rst US ''wage earner reorganization'' law, developed in the 1930s, secured creditors had an absolute veto over any modi¢cation of their rights in a Chapter XIII payment plan. 188 The new Bankruptcy Code, e¡ective in 1979, took a more critical view of ostensibly ''secured'' claims, allowing debtors in plans under a new Chapter 13 to ''cram down'' a payment plan on dissenting secured creditors by paying only the ''stripped down'' current value of the property securing the claim. The remaining unsecured amount could be paid out in a 3-to 5-year payment plan. 189 This rule has always been subject to an important exception: the rights of creditors secured by a mortgage on the debtor's principal residence were not subject to modi¢cation.
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The US and Danish law and their reforms thus contrast in at least three interesting ways in the context of secured claims. First, the 2005 reform of the US law brought it closer into line with Danish law in one narrow respect:''Lien stripping'' was further erodedtoprohibitmodi¢cationofpurchase-moneysecurityinterestsinpersonalmotor vehiclespurchasedwithin910daysofabankruptcy¢lingandothercollateralpurchased within1year of the ¢ling. 191 Second, the 2005 reform of Danish law attemptedto move toward the US approach of allowing modi¢cation of secured claims, but somewhat surprisingly, only inthe one context where modi¢cation has neverbeen allowedunder US law. 192 Not surprisingly, this e¡ort failed.Third, ironically, the US Congress is now wrestling witha reforme¡ort like the one proposed in Denmarkto allow modi¢cation of home mortgage claims, subject to complex limitations. 193 Events on both sides of the Atlantic illustrate the exceptional power that secured claimants wield in our commercial law and debt relief systems, as well as the di⁄culty in attempting to wrest these special rights from them.
C. Filing rates
Finally, ¢lings levels in both countries demonstrate two things: ¢rst, debtors react to anticipated legislative changes. Both countries experienced a noticeable swing in ¢lings in 2005. The US saw an enormous spike in ¢lings immediately preceding the October15 e¡ective date of the BAPCPA, as lawyers advised clients to seek relief before more restrictive laws were implemented. Contrarily, Denmark saw a jump in ¢lings (many of them repeat ¢lings) immediately following the October1reform, as many courts had advised debtors to abandon earlier ¢led cases and re¢le after the new rules went into e¡ect on 1 October 2005, leaving more money to debtors and requiring less payment.
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Second, despite prominent reform, ¢ling rates will tendback toward the historical trend line so long as the fundamentals of the system structure and debtor economics remain the same. In both countries, ¢lings are returning to historical levels very shortly after the implementation of reform. Indeed, the ¢ling rate in Denmark has not remained elevated even as wide availability of ''quick loans''and other high-cost non-bank consumer loans has doubled since 2004 (to nearly 10 billion crowns) and the number of new negative cases registered in the credit reporting system rose a record18% in 2007. 195 Perhaps a large unmet need will lead to a rise in Danish ¢lings inthe years to come, asthe e¡ects of the worldwide economic instability reaches these borrowers, though the Danish system will o¡er them relief only after their own situations regain the stability that the rest of the world is desperately seeking. Filing rates inthe US are vastly higher overall and rising rapidly backto their pre-2005 levels, but not because of US pro£igacy; rather, the elevated US ¢ling rate is most likely due to increasing income volatility and risk, 196 especially from unemployment, child birth, and health shocks, all of which the general Danish social support system lavishly protects against. One has to wonder whether the Danish approach of dealing with these risks on the front end through a more supportive social safety net is better than the US approach to relegating the victims of volatility to the bankruptcy courts.
VI. Lessons to be Learned in Conclusion
Denmark's move in 1984 turned out to be only the ¢rst step in a long journey of consumer debt adjustment law reform across Europe over the next quarter century. This process continues today, as countries such as Poland and Hungary consider adopting their own ¢rst consumer insolvency laws. The driving force behind this movement continues to be not empathy and altruism for the ¢nancially overburdened, but the same practical concerns that motivated Danish lawyers and o⁄cials to put an end to what they called ''the ¢asco''of an outdated collections system that not only failed to return claims to creditors, but also imposed negative and costly burdens on society.
Most new adopters are ignoring the ¢rst important lesson of the Danish process: forcing debtors to negotiate with creditors before or even after seeking formal relief is a wasteful and counterproductive charade. The private negotiation process simply does not a¡ord the collective perspective or the full and reliable information basis on which a reasonable workout proposal depends. A disinterested intermediary, such as the bankruptcy court, is needed to subjugate individual interests to the bene¢t of the creditor collective, to force creditors to admit the factual losses they already have sustained, and to ensure both sides that a compromise is indeed the best way to minimize losses for all interested parties, including society as awhole. Aproperly designed system should mandate maximum returns to creditors and place real but reasonable demands on debtors to ful¢ll the realistic portion of their obligations.
The second lesson of the Danish system was a long time in coming, and law reformers in many countries are learning this lesson the hard way: leaving the courts to develop discretionary standards for the requirements and demands of relief, especially an acceptable debtor budget, is a recipe for failure.The costs of such an approach, especially the ''unfairness''cost of vast regional disparities in treatment by di¡erent courts, far outweigh whatever bene¢t might be gained from £exible case administration. Reasonable standards canbe set down, and Denmarko¡ers aprime example of how that process is unfolding in a number of European debt adjustment systems.
The Danish experience also illustrates one ¢nal important point: forced debt adjustment is no longer a radical break with legal tradition, and it does not reduce the availability of credit or general payment morality. It is an accepted, e¡ective, and dare say necessary safety valve to maximize the e¡ectiveness of the Western laws of obligations. After a quarter century of experience, we can leave behind the tired arguments about constricting the £ow of credit and instead focus on how best to structure modern approaches to balancing the interests of creditors, debtors, and the societies that depend upon their e¡ective interaction.
